Coding Theorems for a (2; 2)–Threshold Scheme with Detectability of Impersonation Attacks by Iwamoto Mitsugu et al.
Coding Theorems for a (2; 2) Threshold Scheme
with Detectability of Impersonation Attacks
著者 Iwamoto Mitsugu, Koga Hiroki, Yamamoto
Hirosuke
journal or
publication title
IEEE transactions on information theory
volume 58
number 9
page range 6194-6206
year 2012-09
権利 (C) 2012IEEE. Personal use of this material is
permitted. Permission from IEEE must be
obtained for all other uses, in any current or
future media, including
reprinting/republishing this material for
advertising or promotional purposes, creating
new collective works, for resale or
redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse
of any copyrighted component of this work in
other works.
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/117674
doi: 10.1109/TIT.2012.2204546
1Coding Theorems for a (2; 2)–Threshold Scheme
with Detectability of Impersonation Attacks
Mitsugu Iwamoto, Member, IEEE, Hiroki Koga, Member, IEEE,
and Hirosuke Yamamoto, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Coding theorems on a (2; 2)–threshold scheme with
an opponent are discussed in an asymptotic setup, where the
opponent tries to impersonate one of the two participants. A
situation is considered where n secrets Sn from a memoryless
source is blockwisely encoded to two shares and the two shares
are decoded to Sn with permitting negligible decoding error. We
introduce correlation level of the two shares and characterize
the minimum attainable rates of the shares and a uniform
random number for realizing a (2; 2)–threshold scheme that
is secure against the impersonation attack by the opponent. It
is shown that, if the correlation level between the two shares
equals to an `  0, the minimum attainable rates coincide with
H(S)+`, where H(S) denotes the entropy of the source, and the
maximum attainable exponent of the success probability of the
impersonation attack equals to `. It is also shown that a simple
scheme using an ordinary (2; 2)–threshold scheme attains all the
bounds as well.
Index Terms—Correlated sources, hypothesis testing, imper-
sonation attack, secret sharing scheme, threshold scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivations
A secret sharing scheme [1], [2] is a well-known crypto-
graphic technique that enables us to share a secret data among
users. In (t;m)–threshold schemes, for example, a secret S
is encoded to m shares, and the m shares are distributed
to respective participants. Any t out of m participants can
recover S, while t  1 or fewer participants cannot obtain any
information on S in the sense of unconditional security.
In this paper, we focus on the secret sharing scheme in
the presence of opponents. The objective of the opponents is
cheating honest participants. That is, the opponents forge their
shares and try to cheat the honest participants by injecting the
forged shares in the recovery phase of S. This problem was
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firstly discussed by McEliece-Sarwate [3] and Karnin-Greene-
Hellman [4] from the viewpoint of error-correcting codes. In
particular, Karnin-Greene-Hellman [4] and Tompa-Woll [5]
clarified that it is impossible to detect cheating in Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme [1]. In addition, a construction of a
cheating-detectable secret sharing scheme is proposed in [5]
as an extension of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme although it
is much inefficient. So far several schemes have been proposed
to overcome such disadvantages [6]–[9]. In particular, Ogata-
Kurosawa-Stinson [8] derived a lower bound on sizes of shares
under a given maximum success probability " of cheating and
the lower bound is attained if and only if a difference set
exists.
In cheating-detectable threshold schemes, the shares must
satisfy unforgeablity as well as the ordinary requirements as
a threshold scheme. We can actually consider two types of
attacks, impersonation attacks and substitution attacks, simi-
larly to the attacks against secret-key authentication systems
[10]. In the impersonation attack, opponents intend to imper-
sonate participants by injecting forged shares without using
the legitimate shares. The impersonation attack is regarded
as successful if the forged shares are accepted in a recovery
phase of a secret. On the other hand, in the substitution attack,
some of the participants are malicious and forge their shares by
using their shares. The objective of the malicious participants
is cheating honest participants who want to recover S from
their shares.
For instance, Figure 1 shows the two types of attacks against
a (2; 2)–threshold scheme with two shares X and Y . We
assume that the ordinary requirements as a (2; 2)–threshold
schemes, H(SjX) = H(SjY ) = H(S) and H(SjXY ) = 0,
are satisfied. In Fig. 1(a) an opponent generates a forged share
X without using X and Y and tries to impersonate participant
1 who have a share X . In Fig. 1(b) a participant with X forges
X by using X , but not using Y . We assume that in both cases
X is generated probabilistically. Then, it is important to notice
that, X is independent of (X;Y ) in Fig. 1(a), while Y , X
and X form a Markov chain in this order in Fig. 1(b). Thus,
considering the two types of attacks against threshold schemes
corresponds to giving two kinds of probabilistic structures for
all the shares including the forged share.
Cheating-detectable secret sharing schemes are usually
designed to detect substitution attacks [5]–[9] in a non-
asymptotic setup, i.e., the decoding error is not allowed and
the block coding is not considered. These studies treat the
case where a coalition of more than one malicious participants
generates forged shares. However, there exist the following
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Fig. 1. Two (2; 2)–threshold schemes with an opponent
drawbacks in cheating-detectable secret sharing schemes:
 According to [8], it is easy to derive the lower bounds
of share rates, i.e., information bits per secret needed
to describe shares, under a given success probability of
cheating. Unfortunately, however, this result implies that
the optimal share rates increase in order at least 1=" as
"! 0, and hence, an arbitrarily small success probability
of cheating cannot be realized with fixed finite share rates.
 An extension of Shamir’s (t;m)–threshold scheme in [5]
can detect both substitution and impersonation attacks.
This scheme is simple but inefficient from the viewpoint
of share sizes. In addition, the optimal construction [8]
is based on a combinatoric structure called a difference
set, where the difference set exists only in limited cases
and therefore restricts sizes of a secret and shares. Hence,
even in a (2; 2)–threshold scheme, we cannot apply the
optimal scheme to a secret S of arbitrarily given size.
 Almost all constructions include the assumption that
a secret is generated subject to a uniform probability
distribution. This means that developing a near-optimum
cheating-detectable secret sharing scheme for a secret
subject to a non-uniform becomes another problem [9].
In this paper, we focus on the impersonation attack against
a (2; 2)–threshold scheme. Since the impersonation attack is
weaker than the substitution attack, the impersonation attack is
rarely discussed especially in the framework of secret sharing
schemes. However, if we discuss the threshold scheme secure
against impersonation attack in a certain asymptotic setup,
we can unveil another information-theoretic aspect. In fact,
we can find connections to hypothesis testing, authentication
codes and Shannon’s cipher system. In a practical point of
view, we can consider a situation where impersonation attack
seems to be valid. Suppose that in a (2; 2)–threshold scheme
one of the shares, say X , is a uniform random number that
is independent of a secret S. In this case, the participants
having X may generate X subject to a distribution close to
the uniform distribution because analysis of X gives almost
no information to the participant.
B. Contribution of This Study
In this paper, we formulate the problem of a threshold
scheme secure against impersonation attacks in Shannon-
theoretic asymptotic setup [11], [12], and unveil new features
included in the problem. We consider a situation where n
secrets that are generated from a discrete memoryless source
are blockwisely encoded to two shares and the two shares
are decoded to n secrets with permitting negligible decoding
error. While we consider impersonation attacks, the asymptotic
(2; 2)–threshold scheme treated in this paper has the following
features which resolve the three drawbacks pointed above in
cheating-detectable secret sharing schemes:
 An exponentially small success probability of imperson-
ation attack is realized under finite share rates if the
blocklength is sufficiently large.
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 The scheme uses no combinatoric structure and is appli-
cable to arbitrary size of a secret.
 The probability distribution of a secret is arbitrary. In
addition, the scheme can be applied to a more general
class of sources.
Specifically, we give coding theorems on the (2; 2)–
threshold scheme for two cases of blockwise encoding and
symbolwise encoding. In both cases we are interested in the
minimum attainable rates for not only the two shares but also
the uniform random number needed to a dealer for realizing a
cheating-detectable (2; 2)–threshold scheme in an asymptotic
sense. We also evaluate the maximum attainable exponent of
the success probability of the impersonation attack. It turns
out that, if the two shares are correlated, we can easily realize
the (2; 2)–threshold scheme in an asymptotic sense that is
secure against the impersonation attack. This fact motivates
us to define a notion of correlation level of the two shares as
the limit of the normalized mutual information between the
two shares. In a non-asymptotic setup, we note that correlated
shares are firstly discussed in [13] based on a combinatorial
argument.
In the case of blockwise encoding, we consider an encoder
that encodes n secrets Sn = S1S2   Sn blockwisely to two
shares Xn and Yn by using a uniform random number Un,
where throughout the paper the superscript n denotes the
length and the subscripts n indicate dependency of n. The
two shares Xn and Yn are decoded to Sn with decoding
error probability P en that satisfies P
e
n ! 0 as n ! 1.
The two shares are required to satisfy the security criteria
I(Sn;Xn)=n ! 0 and I(Sn;Yn)=n ! 0 as n ! 1, where
I(  ;  ) denotes the mutual information. We can prove that, if
the correlation level of the shares is equal to `, none of the
rates of Xn; Yn and Un cannot be less than H(S) + `, where
H(S) denotes the entropy of the source, and the exponent
of the success probability of impersonation attack cannot be
greater than ` (converse part). Furthermore, we can prove the
existence of a symbolwise of pairs of an encoder and a decoder
that attains all the bounds shown in the converse part (direct
part). Both claims of the direct and the converse parts are
easily extended to the case where Sn is generated from a
stationary ergodic source.
In the case of symbolwise encoding, we consider an encoder
that encodes n secrets Sn to two shares Xn = X1X2   Xn
and Y n = Y1Y2   Yn of length n by using n uniform
random numbers Un = U1U2   Un. In fact, Xn and Y n are
generated by (Xi; Yi) = f(Si; Ui) for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, where
f is an arbitrary deterministic encoder of an ordinary (2; 2)–
threshold scheme satisfying H(SijXi) = H(SijYi) = H(Si)
and H(SijXiYi) = 0. Denote by g a deterministic map
satisfying Si = g(Xi; Yi). We choose an appropriate f so that
(Xi; Yi); i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, can be regarded as i.i.d. correlated
random variables. It is shown that we can realize a (2; 2)–
threshold scheme in an asymptotic sense in which P en vanishes
as n!1, Xn and Y n satisfy a stronger requirement on the
secrecy I(Sn;Xn) = I(Sn;Y n) = 0 and the exponent of the
success probability of the impersonation attack is optimal. In
the proof we construct a decoder of Xn and Y n by using g
and a one-sided test for verifying the joint typicality of Xn
and Y n. This kind of symbolwise setup is first discussed in
[14] for authentication code.
4C. Related Works, Organization
The (2; 2)–threshold scheme secure against the imperson-
ation attack is motivated from the Shannon-theoretic authenti-
cation codes [10], [14]–[16]. In particular, in [14] the authors
discuss the maximum attainable error exponent on the success
probability of the impersonation attack subject to the vanishing
decoding error probability. However, the results given in this
paper is more involved. In fact, in the framework of (2; 2)–
threshold schemes we need to guarantee secrecy of a secret
given one of the two shares. In addition, in this paper we
succeeded in obtaining not only such a maximum exponent
but also the minimum attainable sizes of the shares and the
uniform random number.
The (2; 2)–threshold scheme with detectability of imper-
sonation attacks with the blockwise encoder can be viewed
as one version of Shannon’s cipher system ( [17]–[21] etc.)
when one of the shares is an output from a random number
generator. In a simple asymptotic setup of Shannon’s cipher
system [20], n plaintexts Sn generated from a memoryless
source are encrypted to a cryptogram Wn under a key Un and
Wn is decrypted to Sn under the same key Un with permitting
decoding error probability P en. The encoder and the decoder
are required to satisfy P en ! 0 and I(Sn;Wn)=n ! 0 as
n ! 1. In this setup, the minimum attainable rates of the
cryptogram and the key coincide with the entropy H(S) of
the plaintext. The coding theorems given in this paper imply
the same result under an additional requirement such that the
correlation level of Wn and Un is equal to zero, i.e., ` = 0.
The (2; 2)–threshold scheme with detectability of imper-
sonation attacks with the symbolwise encoder is related to
the problem of secret key agreement [21], [22]. In the se-
cret key agreement problem of the source type model [22],
two users have n outputs Xn = X1X2   Xn 2 Xn and
Y n = Y1Y2   Yn 2 Yn from two correlated memoryless
source, respectively, where (Xi; Yi); i = 1; 2; : : : ; n are i.i.d.
copies of (X;Y ) 2 X  Y subject to a joint probabil-
ity distribution PXY . The two user try to share a nearly
uniform random number with the maximum rate I(X;Y )
by public communications. On the contrary, the symbolwise
encoder in the (2; 2)–threshold scheme with detectability of
impersonation attacks can be interpreted as a generator of
correlated random variables Xn = X1X2   Xn 2 Xn and
Y n = Y1Y2   Yn 2 Yn given independent random variables
Sn and Un, where (Xi; Yi); i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, are regarded as
n i.i.d. copies of (X;Y )  PXY . Since the correlation level
Xn and Y n coincides with I(X;Y ), the minimum attainable
rate of Un turns out to be H(S)+ I(X;Y ). That is, we need
an extra cost of I(X;Y ) in order to generate correlated two
shares.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
a (2; 2)–threshold scheme with detectability of impersonation
attacks with correlation level ` in an asymptotic setup is
formulated. The coding theorems for the blockwise encoder
are given in Section III. Section IV is devoted to the proofs of
the coding theorems. A construction of encoders and decoders
based on a non-asymptotic (2; 2)–threshold scheme and its
optimality are discussed in Section V.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
We consider a (2; 2)–threshold scheme depicted in Fig. 2.
Assume for an integer n  1 that a source generates an n–
tuple of secrets Sn = S1S2   Sn independently subject to a
probability distribution PS on a finite set S. Denote by PSn the
probability distribution of Sn induced by PS , and let PSn(sn)
be the probability that Sn = sn for an sn 2 Sn. Since the
source is memoryless, it holds that PSn(sn) =
Qn
i=1 PS(si)
for all n  1 where sn = s1s2    sn.
In Fig. 2, let Un be the random variable subject to the
uniform distribution on a finite set Un. Assume that Un is
independent of Sn. In this paper, we use the subscript n to
indicate dependency of n, while the superscript n implies the
length. We denote by PUn a probability distribution of Un,
i.e., it holds that PUn(un) = 1=jUnj for all un 2 Un where
j  j denotes the cardinality.
An encoder is defined as a deterministic map 'n : Sn 
Un ! Xn  Yn, where Xn and Yn are finite sets in which
shares Xn and Yn take values, respectively. Hence, we can
write
(Xn; Yn) = 'n(Sn; Un) (1)
from which we can see that Xn and Yn are also random
variables. The joint probability distribution PXnYn of Xn and
Yn is induced from (1). The shares Xn and Yn are distributed
securely to participants 1 and 2, respectively.
Next, consider a situation where an opponent may imper-
sonate one of the two participants. When the opponent imper-
sonates participant 1, the opponent behaves as if he/she were
a participant 1 by injecting a forged share Xn 2 Xn instead
of Xn. This attack is regarded as successful if a decoder fails
to detect impersonation attacks and outputs an element of Sn
fromXn and Yn. Here, we assume that the opponent generates
Xn without using Xn. According to [10], [14]–[16], such
attack is called impersonation attack as opposed to substitution
attack. Similarly, in the case of deceiving participant 1, the
opponent forges a share Y n without using Yn, and tries to
impersonate participant 2. In this case, the attack succeeds
when the decoder outputs an element of Sn from Xn and Y n.
Summarizing, letting ~Xn and ~Yn be the inputs to a decoder,
the following three cases must be considered:
(a0) ( ~Xn; ~Yn) = (Xn; Yn)
(a1) ( ~Xn; ~Yn) = (Xn; Yn)
(a2) ( ~Xn; ~Yn) = (Xn; Y n)
A decoder is defined as a deterministic map  n : Xn 
Yn ! Sn[f?g, where ? is a symbol to declare the detection
of an impersonated attack, i.e., (a1) or (a2). We note here
that the decoder cannot know in advance which one of (a0)–
(a2) actually occurs. On the other hand, we assume that the
opponent knows everything about the encoder and the decoder
except for realizations of Sn; Un; Xn and Yn.
In this situation, we define success probabilities of imper-
sonation attacks. Let An  Xn  Yn be the region that the
decoder  n accepts the pair of shares ( ~Xn; ~Yn) and outputs
an element of Sn, i.e.,
An = f(xn; yn) 2 Xn  Yn :  n(xn; yn) 2 Sng: (2)
5Now, recall that the impersonation attack succeeds if the
decoder outputs an element of Sn when one of (a1) and (a2)
occurs. In the case of (a1), i.e., the opponent impersonates
participant 1, we note that he/she generates a forged share
Xn according to a probability distribution PXn independently
from Sn, Un, Xn, and Yn. In addition, the opponent tries to
optimize PXn so that (Xn; Yn) can be accepted by the decoder
with the maximum probability. This motivates us to define a
success probability to impersonate participant 1 by
PXn = max
PXn
Prf(Xn; Yn) 2 Ang (3)
where the maximization of PXn is taken over all probability
distributions on Xn, and Prfg means the probability with
respect to the (joint) probability distribution of random vari-
able(s) between the parentheses, i.e., (Xn; Yn)  PXnYn =
PXnPYn in this case. Similarly, the maximum success prob-
ability for the impersonation to participant 2 can be defined
as
PYn = max
PY n
Prf(Xn; Y n) 2 Ang (4)
where Prfg is taken with respect to (Xn; Y n)  PXnY n =
PXnPY n .
The decoding error occurs when Sn is not correctly decoded
from legitimate shares in the case of (a0). Hence, the decoding
error probability can be written as
P en = Prf n('n(Sn; Un)) 6= Sng: (5)
It is easy to see that if (xn; yn) 62 An, then  n(xn; yn) =
? 62 Sn. Hence, we have
P en  Prf(Xn; Yn) 62 Ang (6)
for any pair of an encoder 'n and a decoder  n.
Now, we can define a (2; 2)–threshold scheme in an asymp-
totic setup as follows:
Definition 1: We say that a sequence f('n;  n)g1n=1 of an
encoder 'n and a decoder  n asymptotically realizes a (2; 2)–
threshold scheme if it satisfies
lim
n!1P
e
n = 0 (7)
and
lim
n!1
1
n
I(Sn;Xn) = lim
n!1
1
n
I(Sn;Yn) = 0 (8)
where I(; ) denotes the mutual information.
The condition (7) guarantees that the decoding error prob-
ability is negligible if the blocklength n is sufficiently large.
Note that Fano’s inequality [23, Theorem 2.10.1] tells us that
1
n
H(SnjXnYn)  1
n
h(P en) + P
e
n log jSj (9)
where log() = log2() throughout the paper, and H(j) and
h() are the conditional and the binary entropies, respectively.
Hence, if (7) is satisfied, then we have
lim
n!1
1
n
H(SnjXnYn) = 0 (10)
due to the non-negativity of the conditional entropy. On the
other hand, the condition (8) ensures that Sn is secure against
the leakage from one of Xn and Yn if n is sufficiently
large. That is, Sn and either one of the shares are almost
independent under such a condition. We also note that, since
Sn is generated from a memoryless source, (8) implies that
lim
n!1
1
n
H(SnjXn) = lim
n!1
1
n
H(SnjYn) = H(S) (11)
where H() denotes the entropy.
We conclude this section with introducing a notion of
correlation level. The mutual information of two shares plays
a crucial role in detecting impersonation attacks, which will
be clarified in the following sections.
Definition 2: Let f(Xn; Yn)g1n=1 be a pair of shares gener-
ated by a sequence of encoders f'ng1n=1. Then, a non-negative
number ` is said to be a correlation level of f(Xn; Yn)g1n=0
if it holds that
lim
n!1
1
n
I(Xn;Yn) = `: (12)
In particular, if a sequence f('n;  n)g1n=1 of an encoder 'n
and a decoder  n satisfies Definition 1 and the sequence of
shares f(Xn; Yn)g1n=0 generated from f'ng1n=1 satisfies (12),
we say that f('n;  n)g1n=1 asymptotically realizes a (2; 2)–
threshold scheme with correlation level `.
Remark 1: Note that the sequence fI(Xn;Yn)=ng1n=1 in
(12) does not have a limit in general if f(Xn; Yn)g1n=1 is
generated by an arbitrary sequence of encoders f'ng1n=1.
Hence, (12) actually requires the existence of the limit for
the sequence fI(Xn;Yn)=ng1n=1, and the limit equals to `.
III. CODING THEOREMS FOR A (2; 2)–THRESHOLD
SCHEME WITH DETECTABILITY OF IMPERSONATION
ATTACKS
In this section, we give coding theorems for f('n;  n)g1n=1
that asymptotically realizes a (2; 2)–threshold scheme with
correlation level `. We are interested in not only the rates
of Xn, Yn and Un but also the exponents of PXn and P
Y
n
of the sequence f('n;  n)g1n=1. The following theorem is the
converse part of the coding theorem with respect to such rates
and exponents.
Theorem 1: For any sequence f('n;  n)g1n=1 of an encoder
'n and a decoder  n that asymptotically realizes a (2; 2)–
threshold scheme with correlation level `, it holds that
lim inf
n!1
1
n
log jXnj  H(S) + ` (13)
lim inf
n!1
1
n
log jYnj  H(S) + ` (14)
lim inf
n!1
1
n
log jUnj  H(S) + ` (15)
and
lim sup
n!1
max

  1
n
logPXn ; 
1
n
logPYn

 `: (16)
6Theorem 1 is proved in Section IV-A. Theorem 1 tells us
that for an arbitrarily small  > 0 the rates of Xn, Yn and
Un cannot be less than H(S)+ `   for all sufficiently large
n, where ` is an arbitrarily given correlation level. In fact, by
noticing that H(S) + `  H(S) for any `  0, the bounds
on the right hand sides of (13)–(15) coincide with the bounds
in [12, Theorem 1] for (2; 2)–threshold schemes when ` = 0.
Theorem 1 also indicates that the correlation level of shares
is an upper bound on the exponents of PXn and P
Y
n .
The direct part of the coding theorem corresponding to
Theorem 1 is as follows:
Theorem 2: For an arbitrarily given non-negative number
`  0, there exists a sequence f('n;  n)g1n=1 of an encoder
'n and a decoder  

n that asymptotically realizes a (2; 2)–
threshold scheme with correlation level ` satisfying
lim sup
n!1
1
n
log jXnj  H(S) + ` (17)
lim sup
n!1
1
n
log jYnj  H(S) + ` (18)
lim sup
n!1
1
n
log jUnj  H(S) + ` (19)
and
lim inf
n!1 min

  1
n
logPXn ; 
1
n
logPYn

 `: (20)
In particular, the above f('n;  n)g1n=1 also satisfies
I(Sn;Xn) = I(Sn;Yn) = 0 for all n  1 (21)
which is stronger than the condition in (8).
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section IV-B.
Remark 2: Theorem 1 guarantees that f('n;  n)g1n=1 in
Theorem 2 attains the minimum rates of Xn, Yn, and Un,
and the maximum exponents of PXn and P
Y
n . Furthermore,
the limits exist for these rates and exponents, i.e., it holds that
lim
n!1
1
n
log jXnj = lim
n!1
1
n
log jYnj = lim
n!1
1
n
log jUnj
= H(S) + ` (22)
and
lim
n!1 
1
n
logPXn = lim
n!1 
1
n
logPYn = `: (23)
IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2
This section is devoted to the proofs of Theorems 1 and
2. In the proof of Theorem 1, we use a relationship between
hypothesis testing and the (2; 2)–threshold scheme with de-
tectability of impersonation attacks with correlation level `,
which originates from [16] and developed by [14], [15].
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Fix `  0 arbitrarily. We first prove (13). From the basic
properties of the entropy and the mutual information, it holds
that
H(Xn) = I(Xn;Yn) +H(XnjYn)
 I(Xn;Yn) +H(XnjYn) H(XnjYnSn)
= I(Xn;Yn) + I(Xn;SnjYn)
= I(Xn;Yn) +H(SnjYn) H(SnjXnYn): (24)
Hence, (13) is established because
lim inf
n!1
1
n
log jXnj  lim inf
n!1
1
n
H(Xn)
 lim inf
n!1
1
n
I(Xn;Yn)
+ lim inf
n!1
1
n
H(SnjYn)
  lim sup
n!1
1
n
H(SnjXnYn)
= `+H(S) (25)
where the last inequality and the equality are due to (24) and
(10)–(12), respectively. We can establish (14) in essentially the
same way.
Next, we prove (15). Since the encoder 'n is deterministic
for each n  1, we have
H(XnYn)  H(SnUn)
= nH(S) +H(Un) (26)
for all n  1, where the equality follows because Sn is
independent of Un and is generated from a memoryless source.
On the other hand, recalling that
H(XnYn) = H(Xn) +H(Yn)  I(Xn;Yn) (27)
it follows from (26) and (27) that
1
n
log jUnj = 1
n
H(Un)
=
1
n
H(XnYn) H(S)
 1
n
fH(Xn) +H(Yn)  I(Xn;Yn)g  H(S)
for all n  1 (28)
where the first equality follows from the uniformity of Un 2
Un. Therefore, we have
lim inf
n!1
1
n
log jUnj  lim inf
n!1
1
n
H(Xn) + lim inf
n!1
1
n
H(Yn)
  lim sup
n!1
1
n
I(Xn;Yn) H(S)
H(S) + ` (29)
where the last inequality follows from (12) and (25). Note that
we have lim infn!1H(Yn)  H(S) + ` in the same way as
(25).
To prove (16), we use the fact that the decoding error
probability and the success probabilities of impersonation
attack in a (2; 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level `
are closely related to the error probabilities of the first kind
7and the second kind in hypothesis testing, respectively, which
is pointed out in [14]–[16]. Let us consider a simple hypothesis
test with the following two hypotheses:
H0 : ( ~Xn; ~Yn)  PXnYn (30)
H1 : ( ~Xn; ~Yn)  PXnPYn : (31)
Let An  Xn  Yn denote an acceptance region for the null
hypothesis H0. Then, the error probability of the first kind and
the error probability of the second kind of the above hypothesis
testing are given by
n
def=
X
(xn;yn)2Acn
PXnYn(xn; yn) = Pr f(Xn; Yn) 62 Ang
(32)
n
def=
X
(xn;yn)2An
PXn(xn)PYn(yn) (33)
where Acn denotes the complement set of An. It is easy to see
from (6) that P en  n holds for any n  1. Hence, in view
of (7), we have
lim
n!1n = 0: (34)
Furthermore, it follows from (3) that
PXn = max
PXn
Prf(Xn; Yn) 2 Ang
= max
PXn
X
(xn;yn)2An
PXn(xn)PYn(yn)
 n: (35)
Similarly, we also have PYn  n. Therefore, it holds that
  1
n
log n  max

  1
n
logPXn ; 
1
n
logPYn

for all n  1: (36)
According to [24, Theorem 4.4.1] and [14, Theorem 2], we
have
I(Xn;Yn) =
X
(xn;yn)
2XnYn
PXnYn(xn; yn) log
PXnYn(xn; yn)
PXn(yn)PYn(yn)
=
X
(xn;yn)2An
PXnYn(xn; yn) log
PXnYn(xn; yn)
PXn(xn)PYn(yn)
+
X
(xn;yn)2Acn
PXnYn(xn; yn) log
PXnYn(xn; yn)
PXn(xn)PYn(yn)

 X
An
PXnYn(xn; yn)
!
log
P
An PXnYn(xn; yn)P
An PXn(xn)PYn(yn)
+
0@X
Acn
PXnYn(xn; yn)
1A log PAcn PXnYn(xn; yn)P
Acn PXn(xn)PYn(yn)
=(1  n) log 1  n
n
+ n log
n
1  n
=  h(n)  (1  n) log n   n log(1  n)
  h(n)  (1  n) log n (37)
where the first inequality follows from the log sum inequality,
and the second inequality holds because  n log(1 n)  0.
Hence, it follows from (36) and (37) that
1
n
I(Xn;Yn)   h(n)
n
+ (1  n)max

  1
n
logPXn ; 
1
n
logPYn

for all n  1: (38)
Therefore, we have (16) by taking the limit superior of both
sides of (38) and noticing (34). 
Remark 3: The claim of Theorem 1 can be easily extended
to the case where Sn is generated from a stationary source.
For the case of the stationary source, the entropy H(S) in
the statement of Theorem 1 is replaced with the entropy rate
H
def= limn!1H(Sn)=n. By recalling the existence of the
limit of fH(Sn)=ng1n=1 [23, Theorem 4.2.1], we can easily
check that both the left hand sides of (25) and (29) are bounded
by H + `.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We choose arbitrarily a sequence fng1n=1 of positive num-
bers that satisfies limn!1 n = 0 and limn!1
p
nn = 1.
Let Tn be the typical set defined by
Tn =

sn 2 Sn :
 1n log 1PSn(sn)  H(S)
  n : (39)
Then, it is well-known that (e.g., see [23, Theorem 3.1.2]) Tn
satisfies the following properties:
lim
n!1PrfS
n 2 Tng = 1 (40)
jTn j  2nfH(S)+ng for all n  1: (41)
For an arbitrary `  0, let Ln def= f0; 1; : : : ; Ln 1g andMn def=
f0; 1; : : : ;Mn  1g be sets of integers where Ln def= b2n`c and
Mn
def= jTn j.
In the following, we construct a sequence f('n;  n)g1n=1 of
an encoder 'n and a decoder  

n that asymptotically realizes
a (2; 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ` satisfying
jXnj = jYnj = jUnj = Ln(Mn + 1).
The encoder 'n can be constructed as follows: SinceMn =
jTn j, there exists a bijection n : Tn ! Mn. Furthermore,
define a map +n : Sn !M+n where M+n def= Mn [fMng by
+n (s
n) =

n(sn); if sn 2 Tn
Mn; otherwise
(42)
and let Zn
def= +n (S
n). Denote by ULn and U
M
n the random
variables subject to the uniform distribution on Ln and M+n ,
respectively, and define Un = (ULn ; U
M
n ). In addition, we
define two shares by
Xn =
 
XLn ; X
M
n

=
 
ULn ; Zn 	 UMn
 2 Ln M+n (43)
Yn =
 
ULn ; U
M
n
 2 Ln M+n (44)
where 	 represents the subtraction of modulo Mn + 1.
8Next, let us define the decoder  n. Let xn = (x
L
n ; x
M
n ) 2
Ln M+n and yn = (yLn ; yMn ) 2 Ln M+n be the inputs
to the decoder. Then, the decoder  n first checks whether
xLn = y
L
n holds or not. If x
L
n 6= yLn , the decoder judges that
impersonation attack has occurred and outputs ?. On the other
hand, if xLn = y
L
n , the decoder computes x
M
n  yMn , where 
denotes the addition of modulo Mn +1. If xMn  yMn =Mn,
the decoder outputs ? since the decoding error occurs in such
a case. Otherwise, the decoder outputs  1n (x
M
n yMn ) where
 1n :Mn ! Tn is the inverse map of n. Summarizing, the
decoder  n is written as
 n(xn; yn)
=
8<: 
 1
n (x
M
n  yMn ); if xLn = yLn and
xMn  yMn 6=Mn are satisfied
?; otherwise
(45)
and the acceptance region of  n is given by
An = f(xn; yn) 2 Xn  Yn : xLn = yLn
and xMn  yMn 2Mng: (46)
Hereafter, we prove that the above sequence f('n;  n)g1n=1
realizes the optimal (2; 2)–threshold scheme with correlation
level ` that asymptotically attains all the bounds in (17)–(20).
It suffices to prove Claims 1–5 below.
Claim 1: For an arbitrarily small  > 0, the rates of Xn,
Yn and Un can be less than H(S) + `+  for all sufficiently
large n, i.e., (17)–(19) hold.
Claim 2: The limit inferior of the minimum exponent in
the success probabilities of impersonation attacks is at least `,
i.e., (20) holds.
Claim 3: The decoding error probability for the legitimate
shares vanishes as n goes to infinity, i.e., (7) holds.
Claim 4: For all n  1, the n source outputs Sn are secure
against the leakage from one of Xn and Yn, i.e., (21) holds.
Claim 5: The correlation level between Xn and Yn equals
to `, i.e., (12) holds.
Proof of Claim 1: In order to evaluate the share rates and
the randomness given by (17)–(19), observe that
log jXnj = log jYnj = log jUnj
= logfLn(Mn + 1)g
= log
b2n`c(jTn j+ 1)	
 nfH(S) + `+ ng+ 1 (47)
where the last inequality follows from (41). Hence, it holds
that
1
n
log jXnj = 1
n
log jYnj = 1
n
log jUnj  H(S) + `+ n + 1
n
:
(48)
Taking the limit superior of both sides in (48), Claim 1 is
established. 
Proof of Claim 2: We evaluate PXn in the following way:
PXn = max
PXn
Pr

(Xn; Yn) 2 An
	
= max
PXn
Pr
n
X
L
n = Y
L
n and X
M
n  YMn 2 Tn
o
 max
PXn
Pr
n
X
L
n = Y
L
n
o
= max
P
XLn
Pr
n
X
L
n = U
L
n
o
(a)
= max
P
XLn
X
xLn2Ln
P
X
L
n
(xLn)PULn (x
L
n)
(b)
=
1
Ln
max
P
XLn
X
xLn2Ln
P
X
L
n
(xLn) =
1
Ln
(49)
where Xn
def= (X
L
n ; X
M
n ) 2 Ln  M+n and Yn def=
(Y Ln ; Y
M
n ) = (U
L
n ; U
M
n ) 2 Ln  M+n , and the marked
equalities follow from the following reasons:
(a) X
L
n and U
L
n are independent.
(b) PULn (x
L
n) = 1=Ln holds for all x
L
n 2 Ln.
Similarly, noticing the fact thatXLn = U
L
n , we also have P
Y
n 
1=Ln, and therefore, we conclude that
lim inf
n!1 min

  1
n
logPXn ; 
1
n
logPYn

 lim inf
n!1
1
n
logLn = `: (50)

Proof of Claim 3: Since every legitimate pair (xn; yn) 2 An
of shares is decoded by 'n without error, the decoding error
happens only if the decoder  n outputs ? for a pair of legit-
imate shares (xn; yn). Hence, the decoding error probability
P en can be written as
P en = Prf n(Xn; Yn) =?g
= Prf+n (Sn) =Mng
= PrfSn 62 Tng:
Therefore, it follows from (40) that limn!1 P en = 1  
limn!1 PrfSn 2 Tng = 0. 
Proof of Claim 4: First, we note that Zn and XMn = Zn 	
UMn are independent because of non-negativity of the mutual
information and
I(Zn;Zn 	 UMn ) =H(Zn) +H(Zn 	 UMn )
 H(Zn; Zn 	 UMn )
=H(Zn) +H(Zn 	 UMn ) H(Zn; UMn )
=H(Zn 	 UMn ) H(UMn )
 0 (51)
where the last inequality holds because Zn	UMn 2M+n and
UMn is subject to the uniform distribution onM+n . Hence, Zn
and Xn = (XLn ; X
M
n ) are also independent because
I(Zn;Xn) = I(Zn;XLnX
M
n )
= I(Zn;XMn ) + I(Zn;X
L
n jXMn )
= 0 (52)
9where the last equality follows since I(Zn;XMn ) = 0, and
Zn, XMn , and X
L
n form a Markov chain in this order.
In order to show (21), it is sufficient to prove that
I(Sn;Xn) = 0 for all n  1 because I(Sn;Yn) = 0
for any n  1 trivially holds from the fact that Sn and
Yn = (ULn ; U
M
n ) are independent. In addition, I(Sn;Xn) = 0
is established from I(Sn;Xn)  I(Zn;Xn) = 0 which
is obtained by the information processing inequality [23,
Theorem 2.8.1] for a Markov chain Sn ! Zn ! Xn, and
recalling (52). 
Proof of Claim 5: The correlation level can be evaluated as
follows. Note that the mutual information of shares Xn and
Yn satisfies
I(Xn;Yn) = I(XLnX
M
n ;Y
L
n Y
M
n )
= I(ULnX
M
n ;U
L
n U
M
n )
=H(ULnX
M
n ) H(XMn jULn UMn )
 H(ULn jXMn ULn UMn )
(c)
= H(ULn ) +H(X
M
n ) H(XMn jUMn )
(d)
= H(ULn ) +H(X
M
n ) H(Zn) (53)
where the marked equalities hold because of the following
reasons:
(c) ULn and X
M
n are independent, and U
L
n , U
M
n , and X
M
n
form a Markov chain in this order.
(d) It follows that H(XMn jUMn ) = H
 
Zn 	 UMn jUMn

=
H
 
ZnjUMn

= H (Zn) due to the independence of Sn
and Un.
Hereafter, we evaluate the terms on the right hand side of (53).
It is easy to see that
H(ULn ) = logLn = logb2n`c: (54)
The second term in the right hand side of (53) can be evaluated
as
H(XMn )  log(Mn + 1)
= log(jTn j+ 1)
 nfH(S) + ng+ 1 (55)
where the last inequality follows from (41). In order to evaluate
the last term on the right hand side of (53), we set n =
Prf+n (Sn) =Mng = PrfSn 62 Tng. Clearly, limn!1 n =
0 from (40). Since the map n : Tn !Mn is bijective, we
have
H(Zn) = H(+n (S
n))
=
X
sn2Tn
PSn(sn) log
1
PSn(sn)
+ n log
1
n

X
sn2Tn
PSn(sn)nfH(S)  ng   n log n
= (1  n)nfH(S)  ng   n log n (56)
where the inequality holds because of (41). Hence, we have
from (55) and (56) that
H(XMn ) H(Zn)
 nnH(S) + n(2  n)n + n log n + 1: (57)
On the other hand, it is easy to see with the same reason for
the equality (d) in (53) that
H(XMn ) H(Zn)  H(XMn jUMn ) H(Zn) = 0: (58)
Summarizing, we have from (53), (54), (57), and (58) that
1
n
logb2n`c  1
n
I(Xn;Yn)
 1
n
logb2n`c+ nH(S)
+ (2  n)n + 1
n
(n log n + 1) : (59)
By taking the limit of both sides of (59) and noticing that
limn!1 n = limn!1 n = 0, we have
lim
n!1
1
n
I(Xn;Yn) = `: (60)

Since Claims 1–5 are verified, Theorem 2 is proved. 
Remark 4: The claim of Theorem 2 is valid for the class
of stationary ergodic sources if the entropy H(S) in Theorem
2 is replaced with the entropy rate H def= limn!1H(Sn)=n.
This fact is obtained by a slight modification of the proof
of Theorem 2 followed by the diagonal line argument [25,
Theorem 1.8.2]. First, by the asymptotic equipartition property
[23, Theorem 3.1.2], we have
lim
n!1PrfS
n 2 Tn;g = 1 (61)
for any constant  > 0, where
Tn; def=

sn 2 Sn :
 1n log 1PSn(sn)  H
   (62)
and H denotes the entropy rate of the source. We construct
an encoder 'n; and a decoder  

n; in the same way
as in the proof of Theorem 2. It is easily checked that
f('n; ;  n;)g1n=1 asymptotically realizes the (2; 2)–threshold
scheme. In addition, by the same argument with (48) and (59),
f('n; ;  n;)g1n=1 satisfies
1
n
log jXnj = 1
n
log jYnj = 1
n
log jUnj  H+ `++ 1
n
(63)
and
1
n
logb2n`c  1
n
I(Xn;Yn)
 1
n
logb2n`c+ n;H + (2  n;)
+
1
n
(n; log n; + 1) (64)
where n;
def= PrfSn =2 Tn;g ! 0 as n!1. Note that (64)
implies that 1nI(Xn;Yn)  `
  3 for all n  N0(): (65)
We now fix a sequence fmg1m=1 satisfying 0 > 1 >
   > m >    > 0 arbitrarily and define N0 = 1 and
Nm; m = 1; 2; : : : ; as the minimum integer N satisfying
j I(Xn;Yn)=n   ` j  3m for all n  N . Obviously,
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fNmg1m=1 is monotone nondecreasing. We define ('n;  n)
as ('n;0 ;  

n;0) for each 1  n < N1 and ('n;m ;  n;m)
for each Nm  n < Nm+1; m = 1; 2; : : :. Then, in view
of (63), (65) and m # 0 as m ! 1, we can conclude that
f('n;  n)g1n=1 satisfies
lim sup
n!1
1
n
log jXnj = lim sup
n!1
1
n
log jYnj = lim sup
n!1
1
n
log jUnj
 H + ` (66)
and
lim
n!1
1
n
I(Xn;Yn) = `: (67)
V. ANOTHER OPTIMAL SCHEME USING SYMBOLWISE
ENCODING
In Section III, we have shown by using blockwise coding
that the sequence f('n;  n)g1n=1 of an encoder and a decoder
realizes the asymptotically optimal (2; 2)–threshold scheme
with correlation level `. In addition, f('n;  n)g1n=1 also
attains the maximum exponent in the success probabilities of
impersonation attack which is given by `. In this section, by
using a symbolwise encoding, we give a simple construction of
f('n;  n)g1n=1 that realizes the asymptotically optimal (2; 2)–
threshold scheme with correlation level ` and the exponent in
the success probability of impersonation attacks equals to `.
In this construction, we use a pair (f; g) of an encoder f and
a decoder g for a (2; 2)–threshold scheme for a single source
output S. In addition, a one-sided test is used to detect the
impersonation attacks.
Let S;U;X and Y be random variables of a secret, a random
number, and two shares taking values in finite sets S;U ;X and
Y respectively. For a non-negative number `, we first define
a pair (f; g) of an encoder f and a decoder g for a (2; 2)–
threshold scheme with correlation level `. That is, the encoder
f : S  U ! X  Y is defined to be a deterministic map
satisfying
H(SjX) = H(SjY ) = H(S) (68)
H(SjXY ) = 0 (69)
in addition to
I(X;Y ) = ` (70)
where shares X and Y are determined by (X;Y ) = f(S;U).
Note that (68) and (69) are the ordinary requirements for
(2; 2)–threshold schemes, i.e., (68) guarantees that any infor-
mation of S does not leak from either one of the shares, and
(69) implies that the secret S can be decoded from X and
Y without error. Hence, let g : X  Y ! S [ fg be a
decoder corresponding to f and satisfying g(x; y) =  for
every (x; y) 2 X  Y that does not belong to the range of
f . Furthermore, (70) means that the correlation level of X
and Y generated by the encoder f is equal to `. We say
that a pair (f; g) of an encoder f and a decoder g realizes
a (2; 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ` in the non-
asymptotic sense if (f; g) satisfies (68)–(70). In addition, it is
shown in [26] that
min f jX j; jYj; jUj g  jSj (71)
must be satisfied for any encoder of (2; 2)–threshold schemes
satisfying (68) and (69). Hence, we also impose (71) on f in
addition to (68)–(70).
In this setting, we define an encoder 'n : Sn  Un !
Xn  Yn as the repeated application of f : S  U ! X  Y
to (Si; Ui), i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, which can be written as
'n(s
n; un) def= f(s1; u1)f(s2; u2)    f(sn; un) (72)
where sn def= s1s2    sn 2 Sn and un def= u1u2   un 2 Un are
n secrets and n random numbers, respectively. Hence, the two
shares Xn = X1X2   Xn 2 Xn and Y n = Y1Y2   Yn 2
Yn are i.i.d. copies ofX and Y , respectively, where (Xi; Yi) =
f(Si; Ui).
Furthermore, we define
An =

(xn; yn) 2 Xn  Yn :
1
n
log
PXY (xn; yn)
PXn(xn)PY n(yn)
> I(X;Y )  n

(73)
where n is an arbitrary sequence of positive integers fng1n=1
satisfying limn!1 n = 0 and limn!1
p
nn = 1. Then,
legitimate shares belong to An with high probability if n is
sufficiently large since
lim
n!1Prf(X
n; Y n) 2 Ang = 1 (74)
holds from the law of large numbers. Hence, we regard the
received shares as legitimate if they belong to An, and decode
them by the decoder gn corresponding to the encoder 'n in
(72), where gn can be written as
gn(xn; yn)
def= g(x1; y1)g(x2; y2)    g(xn; yn): (75)
In addition, the decoder  n : XnYn ! Sn[f?g is defined
by
 n(x
n; yn) =

gn(xn; yn); if (xn; yn) 2 An
?; otherwise (76)
where ? means that the impersonation attack, i.e., (a1) or
(a2) in Section II, is detected.
According to (74), every (xn; yn) 2 An satisfies
PXnY n(xn; yn) > 0, which is equivalent to PXY (xi; yi) > 0,
i.e., g(xi; yi) 6= , for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. Hence, for
every (xn; yn) 2 An, there uniquely exists sn 2 Sn that
satisfies gn(xn; yn) = sn whether the received shares xn
and yn are legitimate or not. Furthermore, if the pair of
shares (xn; yn) 2 An is legitimate, the secret is reproduced
without error due to the definitions of f and 'n. More
precisely,  n(x
n; yn) = gn(xn; yn) = sn holds for every
un 2 Un, sn 2 Sn, xn 2 Xn and yn 2 Yn satisfying
'n(s
n; un) = (xn; yn) 2 An.
The above sequence f('n;  n)g1n=1 defined by (72) and
(76) realizes an asymptotic (2; 2)–threshold scheme with cor-
relation level `.
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Theorem 3: Let (f; g) be any pair of an encoder and a
decoder that realizes a (2; 2)–threshold scheme with corre-
lation level ` in the non-asymptotic sense. Then, the sequence
f('n;  n)g1n=1 defined by (72) and (76) satisfies for all n  1
that
P en = Prf(Xn; Y n) 62 Ang (77)
H(SnjXn) = H(SnjY n) = H(Sn) (78)
I(Xn;Y n) = n` (79)
which obviously realizes an asymptotic (2; 2)–threshold
scheme with correlation level `. In addition, this
f('n;  n)g1n=1 satisfies (20).
Proof of Theorem 3: First, we prove (77). If there is a one-
to-one correspondence between (sn; un) and (xn; yn), (77)
is obvious. We show that (77) holds for any pair of f and g
satisfying (68) and (69) which does not guarantee the existence
of such a one-to-one correspondence.
Define
Dn(xn; yn) = f(sn; un) : 'n(sn; un) = (xn; yn)
and  n(x
n; yn) = sng: (80)
Recalling that  n(xn; yn) = gn(xn; yn) = sn for every un 2
Un, sn 2 Sn, xn 2 Xn and yn 2 Yn satisfying 'n(sn; un) =
(xn; yn) 2 An, it holds for all (xn; yn) 2 An that
Dn(xn; yn) = f(sn; un) : 'n(sn; un) = (xn; yn)
and gn(xn; yn) = sng
= f(sn; un) : 'n(sn; un) = (xn; yn)g
def= 'n
 1(xn; yn) (81)
where 'n
 1(xn; yn) means the inverse image of (xn; yn).
Next, we define
Dn = f(sn; un) :  n('n(sn; un)) = sng: (82)
Then, since  n(x
n; yn) =? for all (xn; yn) 62 An and sn is
reproduced without error from every (xn; yn) 2 An, we have
Dn =
[
(xn;yn)2An
Dn(xn; yn)
=
[
(xn;yn)2An
'n
 1(xn; yn) (83)
where the second equality follows from (81). Furthermore,
since 'n is deterministic, it is easy to see that
'n
 1(xn; yn) \ 'n 1(~xn; ~yn) = ;
for all (xn; yn) 6= (~xn; ~yn): (84)
From (83) and (84), it is shown that
f'n 1(xn; yn)g(xn;yn)2An is a partition of Dn. Therefore,
we have
1  P en =
X
(sn;un)2Dn
PSnUn(sn; un):
=
X
(xn;yn)2An
X
(sn;un)2'n 1(xn;yn)
PSnUn(sn; un)
=
X
(xn;yn)2An
PXnY n(xn; yn)
= Prf(Xn; Y n) 2 Ang (85)
where the first equality comes from the definition of the
decoding error probability and the third equality is due
to the definition of PXnY n(; ), i.e., PXnY n(xn; yn) =P
(sn;un)2SnUn:'n(sn;un)=(xn;yn) PSnEn(s
n; un). Hence,
we obtain (77). It is easy to see from (74) that P en satisfies
(7) i.e., the decoding error probability of  n in (76) vanishes
as n goes to infinity.
In order to establish Theorem 3, it remains to show that
f('n;  n)g1n=1 satisfies (20). Note that (78) and (79) clearly
hold from (68) and (70), respectively. To this end, we evaluate
the success probability of the impersonation attack as follows:
PXn = max
PXn
Pr
n
(X
n
; Y n) 2 An
o
= max
PXn
X
(xn;yn)2An
PXn(x
n)PY n(yn)
max
PXn
X
(xn;yn)2An
PXn(x
n)
PXnY n(xn; yn)
PXn(xn)
2 n(` n)
 max
PXn
X
(xn;yn)
2XnYn
PXn(x
n)
PXnY n(xn; yn)
PXn(xn)
2 n(` n)
= 2 n(` n) (86)
where the first inequality follows from (73) which implies
PY n(yn) <
PXnY n(xn; yn)
PXn(xn)
2 nfI(X;Y ) ng
=
PXnY n(xn; yn)
PXn(xn)
2 n(` n) (87)
for any (xn; yn) 2 An. Similarly, we have PYn  2 n(` n).
Hence, we obtain (20) since limn!1 n = 0. 
Since Theorem 3 has been proved, we are now interested
in a relation between the share rates and the correlation level
attained by a pair (f; g) of an encoder f and a decoder g,
which is given by the following claim:
Claim 6: Let M and MS be arbitrary positive integers
satisfying M  MS . Then, there exists a pair (f; g) of
an encoder f and a decoder g for a (2; 2)–threshold scheme
with correlation level ` = logM H(S) in the non-asymptotic
sense satisfying jX j = jYj = jUj =M and jSj =MS .
Remark 5: According to Claim 6, the rates of shares and
randomness are log jX j = log jYj = log jUj = logM =
H(S)   `, which coincides with the lower bounds of the
rates given by (17)–(19). Hence, the sequence f('n;  n)g1n=1
defined by (72) and (76) also achieves all the bounds in
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Theorem 2. Observe that the sequence of encoders f'ng1n=1
in this section is simpler than the the sequence of encoders
presented in Theorems 2. For instance, Sn cannot be encoded
symbolwisely by the sequence of encoders in the proof of
Theorem 2 since the correlation of two shares is generated by
the random variable ULn in both shares contained in common.
On the other hand, symbolwise encoding is possible by the
sequence of encoders in this section since Xi and Yi are
correlated due to f for every i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. Furthermore,
such symbolwise encoding also enables us that I(Si;Xi) =
I(Si;Yi) = 0 for every i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, which is stronger than
the security condition given by (21) in Theorem 2.
However, we note that M , MS and the correlation level
` cannot be set arbitrarily in Claim 6 although they can be
taken arbitrarily in Theorem 2, which is compensation for the
simplicity.
Remark 6: In the threshold scheme with detectability of
substitution attacks in a non-asymptotic setup (e.g., [3]–[8]),
it is shown that any ideal secret sharing scheme cannot detect
any forgery of shares with probability 1. Furthermore, as is
shown in [26], we note that the ideal secret sharing schemes
can be realized if and only if jX j = jYj = jSj and S is
uniformly distributed.
Similarly, in the asymptotic setup discussed in this section, it
is impossible for any (f; g) of an ideal (2; 2)–threshold scheme
to achieve PXn and P
Y
n with exponential order of n because
the correlation level logM   H(S) = 0 is satisfied if and
only if M = jSj and S is uniformly distributed. On the other
hand, we note that ` is positive for arbitrary distribution of S
if min f jX j; jYj; jUj g > jSj. 
Proof of Claim 6: From (71), let us define
X = Y = U = f0; 1; : : : ;M   1g (88)
S = f0; 1; : : : ;MS   1g (89)
where M  MS . Define the encoder f : S  U ! X  Y
for a secret s 2 S and a random number u 2 U as
f(s; u) = (s	 u; u) (90)
where 	 denotes the subtraction of modulo M . Then, the
corresponding decoder g : X Y ! S [ fg can be written
as
g(x; y) =

x y; if x y 2 S
; otherwise (91)
where  represents the addition of modulo M . Note that the
secret s can be decoded by g without error, and hence, (69) is
satisfied. Furthermore, we can check that a pair of the shares
(X;Y ) is generated according to the conditional probability
distribution
PXY jS(x; yjs) =

1=M; if s = x y 2 S
0; otherwise (92)
if we apply the encoder f defined in (90) to the secret S
with an arbitrary probability distribution PS(). Hence, the
following discussion holds for an arbitrary distribution on S.
This idea is based on the secret sharing scheme for non-
uniform secret distribution studied in [26].
We show that (68) is satisfied by X and Y generated by
f. For every fixed x 2 X and s 2 S , we can check that there
exists a unique y 2 Y , satisfying s = g(x; y). Hence, it holds
from (92) that
PXjS(xjs) =
X
y2Y
PXY jS(x; yjs)
=
1
M
(93)
for every (x; s) 2 X  S. Then, we have
PX(x) =
X
s2S
PXjS(xjs)PS(s)
=
X
s2S
1
M
 PS(s)
=
1
M
: (94)
From (93) and (94), it is shown that S and X are statistically
independent. Similarly, it can be shown that S and Y are
statistically independent, and hence, (68) is proved.
The correlation level of X and Y generated by f can be
calculated as follows. We note that
H(XY )
(e)
= H(US)
(f)
= H(U) +H(S)
= logM +H(S) (95)
where the marked equalities (e) and (f) hold since
(e) there exists a bijection between U  S and X  Y .
(f) U and S are statistically independent.
Therefore, we obtain from (94) and (95) that
I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y ) H(XY )
= 2 logM   flogM +H(S)g
= logM  H(S): (96)
Hence, it is shown that the pair (f; g) of the encoder and
the decoder actually realizes a (2; 2)–threshold scheme with
correlation level logM  H(S). 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper is concerned with coding theorems for a (2; 2)–
threshold scheme in the presence of an opponent who im-
personates one of the participants. We have considered an
asymptotic setup of the (2; 2)–threshold scheme in which n
secrets from a memoryless source are encoded to two shares
by using a uniform random number, and the two shares are
decoded to the n secrets with permitting negligible decoding
error probability. We have investigated the minimum attainable
rates of the two shares and the uniform random number, and
the maximum exponents of the probabilities of the successful
impersonation from a Shannon-theoretic viewpoint. We have
presented coding theorems for two cases of encoding, i.e.,
blockwise and symbolwise encoding.
In the first case, we have considered the situation where
the n secrets are encoded blockwisely to two shares. We
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have defined the correlation level `  0 of the shares as the
limit of the normalized mutual information between the two
shares. In the converse part it is shown that for any sequence
f('n;  n)g1n=1 of pairs of an encoder 'n and a decoder  n
that asymptotically realizes a (2; 2)–threshold scheme with
the correlation level `, none of the rates can be less than
H(S)+`, where H(S) denotes the entropy of the source, and
the exponent of the probability of the successful impersonation
cannot be less than `. In addition, we have shown the existence
of a sequence f('n;  n)g1n=1 of pairs of an encoder 'n and
a decoder  n that attains all the bounds given in the converse
part. The obtained results can be easily extended to the case
where the n secrets are generated from a stationary ergodic
source.
In the second case, we have considered the situation where
the n secrets are encoded symbolwisely to two shares of length
n by repeatedly applying the encoder of an ordinary (2; 2)–
threshold scheme to the n secrets. While the above converse
part is valid in this setup, we can give another interesting
decoder in the direct part. That is, we have shown that the
impersonation by an opponent can be verified with probability
close to one by verifying the joint typicality of the two shares.
It turns out that these encoder and decoder also attain all the
bounds in the converse part.
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